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Abstract 
In this paper, we test between suppression and activation accounts 
of metaphor processing by means of a novel metaphor interference 
paradigm that makes use of mouse-tracking. The goal is to 
understand how context influences the activation of salient and 
non-salient features of a concept during the on-line processing of a 
metaphor. In two mouse-tracking experiments, we examine the 
activation and availability of conceptual features that were either 
irrelevant or relevant for understanding a metaphor across various 
contexts. Our findings support the conclusion that context works 
primarily by rapidly suppressing salient features of a concept that 
are not relevant for the particular metaphorical interpretation. What 
is more, it seems that even further contextual manipulation does 
not facilitate the activation of non-salient metaphor relevant 
features.   
Keywords: Figurative language, lexical pragmatics, 
psycholinguistics, mouse-tracking. 
Introduction 
Among the most intriguing aspects of language are the 
creative ways in which we can use it.  We often use words 
and sentences in novel ways that create nonce 
interpretations of a stable linguistic repertoire for various 
social and pragmatic purposes. One particularly contentious 
debate surrounding creative language use is how we 
understand figurative language. While much research has 
sought to understand the various linguistic and conceptual 
mechanisms needed to understand figurative meaning 
(Glucksberg, 1998, Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), less attention 
has been paid to the pragmatic enrichment mechanisms 
needed to rapidly integrate contextual information into 
figurative interpretations (Gibbs, 2002).   
   In this paper, we address this question by using a novel 
mouse-tracking paradigm in an attempt to better understand 
how context affects the on-line processing of figurative 
language. Specifically, we examine metaphorical 
interpretations, which have received the greatest amount 
attention in the psycholinguistics literature, and report the 
results from two experiments designed to test between two 
contrasting views of how context can aid the comprehension 
of metaphors; either by suppressing information not relevant 
for the metaphorical interpretation or by increasing the 
accessibility of information needed to reach it.. 
Metaphors and language processing 
Many early experimental studies have demonstrated that 
metaphor processing is incompatible with the standard 
“literal-first” Gricean view of pragmatics (Gibbs, 2002). 
This is because figurative speech is understood just as 
quickly, and in some cases even more quickly, than literal 
speech (see Glucksberg, 2001 & Glucksberg, 2003 for 
extensive reviews). Processing delays reported in the 
literature are more likely to occur for unfamiliar metaphors, 
due to the relative difficulty needed to integrate contextual 
information into the novel interpretation at hand (Shinjo & 
Meyers, 1987), while reaction time differences might 
ultimately stem from speed-accuracy trade-off issues. 
McElree & Nordlie (1999), for example, observed that 
literal and figurative meanings might be derived equally 
fast, but the overall accuracy of figurative speech 
interpretation seems to be lower than that of literal speech at 
both early and late processing times. These findings suggest 
that strong contexts should not decrease the processing time 
for figurative language, but only increases the likelihood 
that the intended interpretation will be understood. 
The finding that both literal and metaphorical speech is 
understood with the same speed and facility has been a 
central tenet of numerous theoretical accounts in 
psychology. One example is the class inclusion model 
(Hampton, 1988; Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990),  according 
to which, understanding a metaphor such as “his job is a 
jail” amounts to updating the topic’s category structure by 
integrating select features of the vehicle ‘jail’ (e.g. 
“confinement”, “no exit”, etc.) into it. Experimental work 
seems to suggest that this is done by first suppressing basic 
level meanings of a category (Gernsbacher, Keysar, 
Robertson, & Werner, 2001) and then creating ad hoc 
categories from the combination of topic and vehicle 
features (Barsalou, 1983).  
Another prominent account that incorporates the lack of 
processing time difference between literal and metaphorical 
speech is that of Cognitive Linguistics (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1983), which suggests that literal and metaphorical 
interpretation do not rely on different processing 
mechanisms. According to this approach, understanding 
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literal and metaphorical speech involves the recognition of 
patterns as opposed to complex mappings assumed in other 
theories; in the case of “my job is a jail”, for example, both 
“job” and “jail” share the “container” relationship.  
Figurative language and lexical pragmatics 
In linguistics, researchers have sought to integrate the 
findings mentioned above into both more formal and 
processing-oriented theories. For example, Relevance 
Theory currently offers an account of metaphor as a case of 
conceptual broadening and narrowing (Sperber & Wilson 
2008). Relying on the aforementioned idea of ad-hoc 
categories (Barsalou 1983), relevance theorists also hold 
that nonce conceptual categories are constructed for each 
contextually specific metaphorical use. For example, in a 
metaphor such as “the goalie is a spider”, the vehicle 
‘spider’ is assumed to encompass encyclopaedic 
information (“insect”, “has 6 legs”, “fangs”, “catches prey 
in web”, etc.), which is selectively combined into a 
contextually relevant ad-hoc category SPIDER* (denoting 
something like “catches things near its web”) after certain 
features of the lexically encoded concept SPIDER are 
suppressed.  
Other accounts seem to rely more on processes of 
activation when it comes to explaining how context helps 
process figurative language on-line. The direct access view, 
for instance, holds that context primes the relevant features 
needed to interpret the figurative meaning to the extent that 
figurative meanings are interpreted in an almost identical 
manner to literal meanings (Gibbs, 2002). This account 
differs from the relevance-theoretic one in that it predicts 
that context affects the way in which conceptual/semantic 
information is accessed from the start rather than further 
processed once a lexical meaning is retrieved during some 
decoding process. This view is consistent with Recanati 
(1995)’s theory of truth-conditional pragmatics, which holds 
that when interpreting a sentence such as “my job is jail”, a 
strong biasing context would make the properties of the 
concept JAIL that are needed for the figurative 
interpretation directly available (e.g. “confined space” as 
opposed to “punishment”).  
Prior work investigating suppression and activation in 
metaphor processing has relied on various priming and 
lexical decision paradigms (see Glucksberg, 2003 for a 
review). For example, Rubio-Fernadez (2007) tested the 
idea of active suppression in a cross modal priming 
paradigm and found that after reading metaphorical 
utterances, metaphor relevant properties remained active at 
longer intervals than metaphor inconsistent properties. This 
suggests that all properties of a given concept are activated 
and then properties not relevant for the metaphor are 
suppressed. One limitation of such studies, however, is that 
reaction time measurements might mask the continuous 
changes in the accessibility of properties. In other words, 
similar reaction times at a given interval might not 
necessarily reflect equal activation levels. In the present 
study, we make use of a novel paradigm to further test how 
suppression and activation mechanisms are implemented 
during on-line metaphor comprehension. We use mouse-
tracking because via motor movements it can provide a 
window into the way in which listeners’ access conceptual 
information during processing, since it “breaks up” the 
button press (Freeman & Ambady, 2010). More specifically, 
we examine how both metaphor relevant and metaphor 
irrelevant features can interfere with mouse-trajectories 
toward metaphorical interpretation. 
Overview of Experiments 
In the following two experiments, a metaphor interference 
paradigm (Glucksberg, Gildea, & Bookin, 1982; Wolff & 
Gentner, 2000) was combined with mouse-tracking. This 
paradigm offers a novel test of the on-line availability and 
competition of salient and contextually relevant features 
during the interpretation of a metaphor. Participants read 
metaphors such as “the goalie is a spider” along with filler 
items such as “the apple is red”. They then clicked on either 
one of two pictures that best captured the overall meaning of 
the utterance. In the critical trials, one of these pictures, the 
correct target, depicted the topic in its metaphorical state 
(goalie making a save), while the other picture, a competitor 
image, was either an attribute from the vehicle available in 
the metaphorical state (spider web) or one only available in 
its non-figurative meaning (spider close-up). The 
interference of competitor target images on participants’ 
mouse trajectories was compared across both literal and 
figurative utterances (Experiment 1) and then across strong 
and weak contexts (Experiment 2).  
   Prior to both of these experiments, participants completed 
a picture norming experiment to determine the relative 
salience of the various attributes for the metaphorical 
vehicle and become familiar with the pictures used in the 
main experiment. For this, they were shown the topic of the 
metaphor in isolation (SPIDER) and were asked to choose 
between the two competitor target pictures (web or close-
up). This allowed for the experimental items (metaphorical 
utterances) to be separated into two groups:  
 
1) Salient (metaphor) relevant feature group - the 
figurative attribute of the vehicle has more baseline 
salience than the literal attribute. 
2) Salient (metaphor) irrelevant feature group - the literal 
attribute of the vehicle has more baseline salience than 
the figurative attribute.  
Experiment 1 
28 participants at Cardiff University took part in both the 
picture-norming and main experiment in exchange for 
course credits. Participants completed both parts of the 
experiment within 30 minutes. 
Stimuli Forty metaphorical sentences were adapted from 
Jones & Estes (2006), in which both the topics and vehicles 
of which had been already been normed for aptness and 
conventionality. In Jones & Estes (2006), aptness was 
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defined as the extent to which the vehicle’s figurative 
meaning expresses an important feature of the topic.  
Conventionality was defined as the strength of the 
association between the metaphor vehicle and its figurative 
meaning. This allowed us to use a variety of metaphors that 
differed along these parameters. 
Various pictures that depicted either relevant (spider web) 
or irrelevant (spider eyes/fangs) features of the metaphorical 
topic in this particular context were collected using Google 
Search. During the collection, multiple candidate pictures 
expressing the metaphorical meaning of the vehicle were 
collected (e.g. an outstretched goalie making a diving save, 
a tall goalie, a goalie stretching, etc.), and several research 
assistants independently decided which one best expressed 
the metaphorical meaning of the utterance at hand. The 
same pictures were used for both the norming and the main 
parts of experiment. 
Norming experiment 
In order to establish the relative salience of the feature 
pictures prior to the main experiment, participants were 
presented with the metaphor topics (spider) and had to click 
on the feature picture that best represented the word. This 
allowed us to distinguish a relative baseline for which 
feature picture was more salient for the topic. For example, 
participants read the word VOLCANO (from “his anger is a 
volcano”) and clicked on either a picture of an inactive 
volcano (metaphor irrelevant feature) or a picture of hot lava 
(metaphor relevant feature). In order for an item to be 
assigned to a group (salient metaphor relevant feature group 
or salient metaphor irrelevant feature group), the average 
ratings for a picture response for a given topic had to be 
above 66%. Two items that were towards chance, i.e. 50/50, 
were excluded from the analysis of the main experiment. 18 
of the 40 metaphor vehicles were rated as having a salient 
(metaphor) relevant feature and 20 of the 40 metaphor 
vehicles were rated as having a salient (metaphor) irrelevant 
feature.  This part of the experiment also served as a way of 
familiarizing participants with the pictures used in the main 
experiment. 
Main experiment 
After completing the norming study, participants were 
instructed to read a sentence and choose the picture that best 
corresponds to its overall meaning. For metaphors, 
participants had to click on the correct target, e.g. a picture 
of the metaphor topic in its figurative state (goalie making a 
save). Different feature pictures (metaphor relevant or 
metaphor irrelevant) were used as competitors to test 1) the 
amount of interference with the correct target and 2) the 
stage in processing (early or late) during which the 
interference occurs. Early interference would suggest that a 
feature is available during lexical access, whereas later 
interference would suggest that this feature becomes 
available at a later stage, i.e. during pragmatic enrichment.  
 
Design and Procedure In the main experiment, participants 
read metaphors such as “The goalie is a spider” as well as 
literal filler items such as “The apple is red”. The filler 
items were included to make sure that participants listened 
until the end of the sentence. Without these sentences, 
listeners could have made their decisions just after hearing 
the metaphor topic. In the filler sentences participants would 
choose between two competing images, which were only 
distinguished by the final word in the utterance (“The apple 
is red” vs. “The apple is green”). For the 40 metaphor items, 
participants saw either one of three target-competitor picture 
versions for metaphorical items.  In the relevant feature 
condition, participants chose between a picture of the 
metaphor relevant feature (spider web) and a picture of the 
topic in its metaphorical state (the outstretched goalie 
making a save). In the irrelevant feature condition, the same 
picture of the topic was used, but in conjunction with a 
metaphor irrelevant feature picture (frontal close up of a 
spider). In the control condition, the same topic picture was 
also used, but the competitor picture had no relationship to 
the topic or vehicle (e.g. an apple). Three lists were created 
so that each participant saw only one version of each item. 
To start a trial, the participant would click on the START 
button at the bottom center of the screen. Each item was 
presented word by word at an interval of 350ms per word. 
Participants were allowed to move the mouse towards a 
picture target, located at the top corners of the screen, only 
at the onset of the final word in the utterance. The trial 
ended once a target was clicked on.  
 
Predictions If participants first access the salient meaning 
of the concept at hand, then salient picture features should 
interfere at an earlier point during the response. This should 
happen for both relevant and irrelevant features, however 
irrelevant features should not interfere later on in the 
response, as these features are not part of the figurative 
meaning, i.e. they become suppressed. Put differently, if a 
metaphor irrelevant feature is indeed the most salient, this 
should interfere with responses towards the correct target 
(picture of topic in metaphorical state) early on during the 
response because it would be “active” during lexical access. 
Similarly, if a metaphor relevant feature is not salient, later 
interference in responses should occur. When metaphor 
relevant features have higher salience than metaphor 
irrelevant features, both early and late interference should be 
noticed because this feature would be active both during 
lexical access as well as during the construction of the 
figurative meaning. 
Results and Discussion 
Figures 1 and 2 show the mouse paths for correct responses 
for the relevant and irrelevant features groups, across salient 
and non-salient items respectively. Control groups were not 
included because mouse paths went directly to the target. To 
examine the relative interference of competitor pictures on 
participants’ mouse paths to the correct targets, the average 
x-coordinates for mouse paths across the feature conditions 
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and saliency groups were compared. The time points for the 
x-coordinates from the normalized mouse paths (101 time 
stamps) were collapsed into 10 groups (or time bins) in 
order to better operationalize early vs. late processing. A 
mixed-model was used to analyze the x-coordinates of the 
mouse paths, which used time-bin, competitor (relevant vs. 
irrelevant), and feature salience as fixed effects. Subjects 
and items were used as random effects. 
Interaction terms for feature competitors and feature 
salience were significant at time bins 30 to 40, t = 2.83, p < 
.05 and time bins 50 to 60, t = 2.51, p < .05. Figure 2 shows 
the mouse paths for the relevant and irrelevant feature 
competitors only for items for which the irrelevant feature 
was rated as more typical of the metaphor vehicle. A cross-
over pattern for x-coordinate position is observed, in which 
metaphor irrelevant features interfere early on in the 
response (time bins 30-40), whereas the metaphor relevant 
feature interfere later on (time bins 50-60). This replicates 
several findings from different paradigms in that salient 
features seem to be more active, i.e. interfere more, during 
early processing and less salient features are accessed later, 
i.e. interfere later during the response. In the next 
experiment, we sought to replicate the cross-over pattern for 
feature interference and then investigate how priming versus 
neutral contexts mediate the availability of features when 
interpreting metaphors.  
 
Figure 1. Time- normalized mouse paths for all conditions 
(competitor feature type vs. salience groups). 
 
 
Figure 2. Time- normalized mouse paths for relevant vs. 
irrelevant features in the salient irrelevant feature group. 
Experiment 2 
In this experiment, prior to each metaphor, participants read 
either a “strong” and “neutral” preceding context. This 
allowed us to test whether contextual information can 
rapidly adjust the relative salience of a feature of a concept, 
as activation accounts would predict. Specifically, “strong” 
contexts should explicitly promote the status/activation of 
metaphor relevant features, whereas “neutral”, albeit 
felicitous ones should not. The direct access view would 
predict that the (late) interference effect found for non-
salient metaphor relevant features should occur at an earlier 
time bin when preceded by strong contexts because of the 
increased activation of these features by the context. 
Suppression accounts, on the other hand, would predict that 
the early interference account for irrelevant features should 
be more diminished in strong when compared to weak 
contexts.  
Norming experiment 
Prior to the main experiment, the same norming experiment 
as Experiment 1 was repeated. The two excluded items from 
Experiment 1 were rated as having high salience metaphor 
relevant features, however 1 of the remaining items was 
now excluded because it did not meet the 66% threshold. 
This resulted in 20 items in the high salience relevant 
feature group and 19 items in the high salience irrelevant 
feature group.  
Main experiment 
The main experiment was identical to Experiment 1 except 
that items were preceded by either neutral or strong 
contexts. Details are discussed below.  
  
Stimuli The stimuli were the same used in Experiment 1. 
The only difference was that items were preceded by a 
strong or weak context. For example, in our example item 
“the goalie is a spider”, the strong context was: “We had 
many opportunities to score, but the ball was always 
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stopped” while the neutral one was: “We had many 
opportunities to score but couldn’t convert our chances”.  
 
Design and Procedure The design and procedure were the 
same as in Experiment 1. The only difference was that 
contexts were presented prior to the onset of the metaphor 
or literal utterance. Participants were able to read each 
context at their own pace and press the enter key in order for 
the word-by-word presentation of the item to start.  
Results and Discussion 
Figures 3 and 4 show mouse paths for the two conditions. 
Using the same time bins from Experiment 1, a mixed 
regression model was used to examine the interaction of 
context, feature competitor, and feature salience.  When 
collapsed across contexts, the same interaction terms for 
feature competitor and feature salience were significant at 
time bins 30 to 40, t = 1.89, p < .05 and at time bins 50 to 
60, t = 3.07, p <. 01. When context was included in the 
interaction terms, they were not significant; time bins 30 to 
40, t = 95, p =.69 and time bins 50 to 60, t = .34, p = 71. 
Context was, however, a significant predictor at time bins 
30-40 for salient irrelevant features when the irrelevant 
features were the competitor, t = 2.61, p < .03, but not at 
time bins 50-60, t =.75, p = 53. 
Experiment 2 replicated the findings from Experiment 1 in 
that early interference effects were observed for irrelevant 
features and late interference effects were observed for 
relevant features when the irrelevant feature was the most 
salient. Both neutral and strong contexts showed the cross-
over interaction, however strong contexts only reduced the 
early interference effects of irrelevant features for items for 
which irrelevant features were the most salient. Taken 
together, these findings provide evidence for suppression 
accounts because relevant features still showed late 
interaction effects even with strong contexts. This is not 
predicted by the direct access view.  
 
 
Figure 3. Time- normalized mouse paths for relevant vs. 
irrelevant features in the salient irrelevant feature groups in 
weak (neutral) contexts. 
 
 
Figure 4. Time- normalized mouse paths for relevant vs. 
irrelevant features in the salient irrelevant feature groups in 
strong contexts. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Time- normalized mouse paths for irrelevant 
features in the salient irrelevant feature groups across weak 
and strong contexts. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In two mouse-tracking experiments, we tested the on-line 
availability of conceptual information when interpreting 
figurative language. Our main question was whether context 
acts primarily by suppressing context-independent features 
during lexical access for metaphorical interpretation or 
whether it increases the availability of non-salient features 
needed to understand the metaphor under question. 
Experiment 1 showed that salient metaphor irrelevant 
features of the vehicle provided early interference in 
participants’ mouse paths towards correct targets. Non-
salient features of the vehicle relevant to the interpretation 
interfered much later on in the participants’ mouse paths 
towards the correct target. Experiment 2 tested whether the 
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presence of a biasing context primes the activation of the 
salient feature that is relevant to the metaphor earlier on in 
processing, but the same cross-over pattern found in 
Experiment 1 was replicated in both the neutral context and 
the strong context conditions. What context seemed to do 
was reduce the early interference effect for metaphor 
irrelevant features when these same features were salient 
features of the vehicle. Taken together, the findings from 
Experiment 2 provide support for suppression accounts.  
While our paradigm did not find increased activation for 
non-salient metaphor relevant features in strong contexts, 
one possibility is that our strong contexts might not have 
been strong enough to adequately test direct access 
accounts. We used one sentence introductory context, when 
classical studies, such as Swinney’s (1979) “bug” task, use 
an entire paragraph of context. In this vein, Noveck, Bianco, 
& Castry (2001) showed that longer contexts speed up 
metaphor processing in comparison to shorter ones. It may 
well be the case that the priming effects associated with 
activation accounts operate on a larger time scale than 
suppression mechanisms. We feel that this is a worthy topic 
for future research, for which our mouse-tracking paradigm 
is well suited to test. 
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